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Abstract In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Basque Parliament
since the restoration of the Spanish democracy. The classic simple games do not fit with the
particular voting rule that it is used to invest the president of the regional government. In
order to model this voting mechanism we incorporate coalitional externalities to the game.
We use the extensions of the most popular power indices to games with externalities that have
been proposed in the most recent literature. Moreover, we propose a method to estimate
the probability of a given coalition based on the ideological positions of its members in a
two-dimensional political spectrum.
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1 Introduction
Power indices and other related game theoretical tools are very useful to study the power
distribution in decision making bodies. For instance, Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) analyze
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the decision making mechanism in the EU Council of Ministers,1 Alonso-Meijide and Bowles
(2005) develop algorithms to examine how power is shared in the IMF, and Huber et al. (2003)
use power indices to study the fiscal policy in the OCDE countries. All these examples model
the decision making procedure by a simple cooperative game with transferable utility, classic
game henceforth. Such games are defined by characteristic functions that attach to every
possible coalition of agents a worth equal to zero or one (0 to losing coalitions and 1 to the
winning ones), are monotonic (if a coalition grows its worth cannot decrease), and there is at
least one winning coalition. This classic model is suitable when the decisions to be made are
dichotomous, usually whether to pass a bill or not. In the literature, a variety of power indices
have been proposed for this kind of game. The most popular ones are the Shapley-Shubik
index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1964),2 both based on
the winning coalitions for which an agent’s participation is crucial. Other indices are based
on minimal winning coalitions for which the participation of every member is critical, like
the Deegan-Packel index (Deegan and Packel, 1978) or the Public good index (Holler, 1982).
The Basque Parliament (Legebiltzarra) uses the plurality rule to elect the president of
the autonomous regional government (Lehendakari). First, every political group with rep-
resentation in the chamber has the right to propose a candidate. Then, every deputy must
vote in favor of one of the candidates or otherwise abstain, that is, voting against is not
allowed. To be appointed Lehendakari in the first ballot, it is necessary that a majority of
the chamber votes in favor. If no candidate fulfills this requirement, a second ballot takes
place 24 hours later, and this time it is enough to get more votes than any other candidate
in order to be elected.3 This voting procedure is not dichotomous because it is intended to
choose among many potential candidates. Consequently, classic games are not appropriate
and richer models need to be employed. Games with coalitional externalities, as introduced
by Thrall and Lucas (1963), provide a convenient framework to model voting procedures
that are based on the plurality rule. These games are defined by partition functions that
describe the worth of every embedded coalition, which consists of a coalition of agents and
an organization of the rest of agents. They describe situations in which the formation of one
coalition can influence the worth of another coalition.
Recently, the study of games with coalitional externalities has attracted the attention
1With the Maastricht Treaty, that is, before the enlargement to eastern Europe.
2This index was actually first proposed by Penrose (1946) but it is most widely known after Banzhaf’s
work.
3Other institutions with similar investiture procedures in Spain are the Parliament of Asturias and the
City Councils.
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of many researchers (Maskin, 2016) and important contributions have been made (see for
instance de Clippel and Serrano, 2008; Macho-Stadler et al., 2007). Here, we use two power
indices introduced in the aforesaid contributions that generalize the Shapley-Shubik index,4
another that extends the Banzhaf index introduced by Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2015), and
the generalizations of the Deegan-Packel and Public good indices defined in Alonso-Meijide
et al. (2017a). We use them to study the distribution of power in Legebiltzarra since 1984.
Here we present the main features of the complete study that can be found in Arévalo-Iglesias
(2018).
The Basque political system is quite particular compared to other regions of Spain. It is
much more fragmented and there are a high number of potentially influential parties in the
chamber. It is generally assumed that the political competition occurs along two fundamen-
tal cleavages: The centre-periphery dimension and the left-right dimension5 (Leonisio and
Strijbis, 2014). Even though some authors (Gillespie, 2000; Leonisio, 2012) think that the
centre-periphery dimension dominates the Basque political system, and some others (Alber-
tos, 2002; De la Calle Robles, 2005) think the opposite, they all agree that these are the two
major dimensions that vertebrate the political competition. We propose a method to esti-
mate the probability of a coalition to emerge using real data about the ideological positions
of the parties along these cleavages. In summon, the above described voting procedure, the
high fragmentation, and the number of competing parties lead to very interesting situations
to be analyzed.
In Section 2 we introduce the models and power indices, explaining in each case the classic
approach and the way in which externalities are incorporated to it. In Section 3 we study
the power distribution in the Basque Parliament applying these indices. Section 4 concludes
by drawing some conclusions from our analysis.
4To be precise, we use their specification to simple games with externalities as defined in Alonso-Meijide
et al. (2017a).
5While the centre-periphery dimension is clearly referred to the nationalist issue, it is not so clear that
the left-right dimension corresponds only with the economic issue, as some authors (Knutsen, 1995; Van der
Eijk et al., 2005) define this cleavage as a super-issue that includes several other dimensions such as the
religious-secular issue or the materalist/post-materialist values.
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2 Simple games with externalities and power indices
A decision making body is described by a set of agents N together with a collection of winning
coalitions W ⊆ {S : S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅}. A classic simple game on the player set N is defined by
a characteristic function v where v(S) = 1 if S ∈ W and v(S) = 0 if S /∈ W . Any sensible
voting procedure gives rise to a monotonic game. That is, v(S) ≤ v(T ) for every S ⊆ T .
The most common voting procedure in a parliament is a majority rule. Classic simple
games are appropriate when voting by majority, either simple or qualified, because whether
a coalition is winning or loosing only depends on the coalition itself. However, this is not
the case for voting mechanisms that use the plurality rule, like an investiture procedure that
allows the emergence of a minority government if the parties in the opposition do not agree
on another alternative. In these cases, whether a coalition is winning or loosing depends also
on the rest of coalitions because the required majority is just relative. These situations can
be considered by incorporating externalities to classic games (Thrall and Lucas, 1963).
Let P(N) denote the set of partitions of the finite set N .6 An embedded coalition is a
pair (S, P ) where S ⊆ N and P ∈ P(N) such that S ∈ P . We denote by ECN the set of
embedded coalitions of N . A game with externalities on the player set N is defined by a
partition function v : ECN → R such that v(∅, P ) = 0 for every P ∈ P(N). For every
(S, P ) ∈ ECN , v(S, P ) describes the worth of a coalition S when the coalition structure P
forms. A simple game with externalities on the player set N (Alonso-Meijide et al., 2017a)
is defined by a partition function v satisfying three conditions. First, v is a {0, 1}-valued
function. Second, it is a monotonic function with respect to the partial order defined in
Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017b) by
(S, P ) ⊆ (T,Q)⇐⇒ S ⊆ T and ∀ T ′ ∈ Q \ {T}, ∃ S ′ ∈ P such that T ′ ⊆ S ′. (1)
Then, v is a monotonic partition function if v(S, P ) ≤ v(T,Q) for every (S, P ), (T,Q) ∈ ECN
such that (S, P ) ⊆ (T,Q). Third, there is at least one embedded coalition whose worth is
equal to 1.
Simple games with externalities fit very well with voting procedures based on the plurality
rule, like the ones described above. Let (S, P ) ∈ ECN . The partition structure P describes
the coalitions that support the different candidates. Then, v(S, P ) = 1 means that S is the
coalition with most votes among the coalitions in P and we say that (S, P ) is a winning
6We consider that the empty set is an element of every partition.
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embedded coalition. Similarly, v(S, P ) = 0 means that S is not the coalition with most
votes among the coalitions in P and we say that (S, P ) is a loosing embedded coalition.
The monotonicity condition can be understood as follows. If (S, P ) is a winning embedded
coalition, then it will remain winning if S itself grows and also if the rest of coalitions in P
become more divided. Finally, the third condition implies that (N, {N, ∅}) must be a winning
embedded coalition.
Since the real instances that we study have too many players to describe them in detail,
here we present a simple example for illustrative purposes.
Example 2.1 Consider a Parliament with four parties, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the following
set distribution: (w1, w2, w3, w4) = (13, 7, 5, 2). Suppose also that the voting procedure is
the plurality rule. As there are no ties, for every partition of the player set there is one
winning embedded coalition. More precisely, for every P ∈ P(N), let S ∈ P be such that∑
i∈S wi >
∑
i∈T wi for every T ∈ P with T 6= S. Then, v(S;P ) = 1 and v(T ;P ) = 0 for
every T ∈ P with T 6= S. Below, we list all winning embedded coalitions omitting braces.
(N ;N),
(123; 123, 4), (124; 124, 3), (134; 134, 2), (234; 1, 234),
(12; 12, 34), (13; 13, 24), (14; 14, 2, 3), (12; 12, 3, 4), (13; 13, 2, 4), (14; 14, 2, 3),
(1; 1, 23, 4), (1; 1, 24, 3), (1; 1, 2, 34), (1; 1, 2, 3, 4).
That is, the simple game with externalities is described by the partition function that assigns
1 to these embedded coalitions and 0 to the rest.
2.1 Shapley-Shubik indices
Shapley and Shubik (1954) proposed a way to measure how decisive are the players in a
classic simple game. The Shapley-Shubik power index is obtained by applying the Shapley
value, the popular solution concept introduced in Shapley (1953) for general classic games,
to a classic simple game. Let ΠN denote the set of permutations or orderings of the finite
set N = {1, . . . , n}. Given π ∈ ΠN , π(i) describes the position of player i at π. The






v ({j : π(j) ≤ π(i)})− v ({j : π(j) < π(i)}) ,
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where v is the characteristic function of the game. In other words, it is the average marginal
contribution of a player to its set of predecessors at any possible ordering. This power index
can also be described using the winning coalitions for which the participation of a player is
critical. Let Pi = {S ∈ W : S \ {i} /∈ W}, the Shapley-Shubik index of player i ∈ N can be




(|S| − 1)!(|N | − |S|)!
|N |!
.
The above expression shows that the Shapley-Shubik index is a measure of decisiveness. The
index has also a nice probabilistic interpretation (Straffin, 1988). Assume that pi is the
probability that player i votes in favor of a bill and that this probability follows a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. Then, the Shapley-Shubik index is the probability of player i’s vote to
change the result under the homogeneity assumption, i.e., if pi = p for every i ∈ N .
In what follows, we present two different extensions of this index to games with external-
ities.
The Externality-free index
de Clippel and Serrano (2008) introduced the Externality-free value of player i ∈ N in a
game with externalities by
ShEFi (v) = Shi(v
∗),
where v is the partition function of the game and v∗ is an associated characteristic function




. The general purpose of the authors
is to extend the axiomatic characterization of Young (1985) to games with externalities.
Therefore, they address the non-trivial problem of generalizing the concept of a marginal
contribution to situations with externalities. When a player i leaves a coalition S to join
another one of the structure T ∈ P with T 6= S, two different effects are considered. The
first, the so-called intrinsic marginal contribution, is the change in the worth of S when player
i leaves it to remain alone. The second, is the externality effect created on S \ {i} by player
i joining coalition T . Then, ShEFi is characterized based on a monotonicity axiom that pays
attention only to the intrinsic marginal contribution. Here we call it Externality-free index
(see Álvarez-Mozos et al., 2017) because we only apply it to simple games with externalities.
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Average index
Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) extended the Shapley value to games with externalities following
an average approach. First, the partition function is transformed into a characteristic function
using a probability distribution. For every (S, P ) ∈ ECN , let α(S, P ) ∈ R+ be7 such that∑




α(S, P )v(S, P ).
Second, the Shapley value of this average classic game is computed. The authors study this
family of Shapley values and characterize it by extending Shapley’s original axioms.
Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) also propose a particular value of this family, obtained by
taking αA(S, P ) =
∏
T∈P\{S}(|T |−1)!
(|N |−|S|)! . We refer to it as the Average index.
8 The Average index





T∈P\{S}(|T | − 1)!
(|N | − |S|)!
βi(S)v(S, P ),
where v is the partition function and βi(S) is defined for every S ⊆ N by βi(S) = (|S|−1)!(|N |−|S|)!|N |!
if i ∈ S and βi(S) = − |S|!(|N |−|S|−1)!|N |! if i /∈ S.
2.2 The Banzhaf index
Banzhaf (1964) proposed an alternative way to measure the decisiveness of a player in a






v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).





That is, the Banzhaf index of player i is the probability that the player is decisive for a
coalition assuming that all coalitions are equally likely. As the Shapley-Shubik index, it
7Where R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}
8Index instead of value because we only apply it to simple games with externalities.
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has an alternative probabilistic interpretation (Straffin, 1988). If pi is the probability that
player i votes in favor of a bill and this probability follows a uniform distribution on [0, 1],
then the Banzhaf index is the probability of player i’s vote to change the result under the
independence assumption, i.e., if pi and pj are independent for every i 6= j.
Λ-Banzaf value
Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2015) suggested two generalizations of the Banzhaf index to
games with externalities using also an average approach like Macho-Stadler et al. (2007).
That is, using collections of probability distributions over the set of coalition structures that
can arise. Here, we focus on the first one: The Λ-Banzhaf index.
Let Ω be the set, possibly infinite, of all potential players. For every finite set of players,
N ⊆ Ω, let λN : ECN → R+ be a mapping such that for every S ⊆ N ,
∑
P∈P(N):S∈P λ
N(S, P ) =
1. In other words, λN provides probability distributions over the coalition structures that
can arise in N \ S for every possible coalition S. We denote by Λ = {λN : N ⊆ Ω} the col-
lections of probability distributions, one for each possible finite player set N ⊆ Ω. Let L be
the set of Λ-s that are consistent in the following sense. First, for every N,N ′ ⊆ Ω and
(S, P ), (S ′, P ′) ∈ ECN such that P \ {S} = P ′ \ {S ′}, λN(S, P ) = λN ′(S ′, P ′). Second, for
every N ⊆ Ω and (S, P ) ∈ ECN\{j}, λN\{j}(S, P ) =
∑
T∈P\{S} λ
N(S, P \ {T} ∪ {T ∪ {j}}).





λN(S, P )v(S, P ).
The Λ-Banzhaf index of player i ∈ N is obtained applying the Banzhaf index to the charac-
teristic function vΛ
BaΛi (v) = Bai(v
Λ)
2.3 The Deegan-Packel and Public good indices
The Deegan-Packel (Deegan and Packel, 1978) and Public good (Holler, 1982) indices for
classic simple games are based on the idea that only minimal winning coalitions matter when
it comes to assess the power of agents. A winning coalition is minimal if all of its members
are critical. Then, compared to the Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf indices they are based in less
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coalitions. The Deegan-Packel and Public good indices of player i ∈ N in a classic simple













where M = {S ∈ W : ∀ T ( S, T /∈ W} is the set of minimal winning coalitions and Mi =
{S ∈M : i ∈ S} is the set of the ones in which player i participates.
On the one hand, the Deegan-Packel index shares the power equally among the minimal
winning coalitions and then also equally among the members of each coalition. On the other
hand, the Public good index assigns power proportionally to the number of minimal winning
coalitions in which each player participates.
DP-Index and PG-Index
Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017a) suggest two very natural generalizations of these power indices
to simple games with externalities. The idea is to use minimal winning embedded coalitions
instead of minimal winning coalitions. A winning embedded coalition is minimal if it does
not contain any other winning embedded coalition with the inclusion relation defined in
Equation (1). Let M(v) be the set of minimal winning embedded coalitions of the simple
game with externalities, this is,M(v) = {v(S, P ) = 1 : ∀ (T,Q) ( (S, P ), v(T,Q) = 0}. Let
alsoMi(v) denote the set of minimal winning embedded coalitions that contain a given player
i, i.e., Mi(v) = {(S, P ) ∈M(v) : i ∈ S}. The extensions of the Deegan-Packel and Public













9We refer to them as DP-Index and PG-Index.
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2.4 Axiomatic foundation
Even if the aim of this paper is not theoretical but rather applied, we include here a brief
comparison of the power indices introduced so far from an axiomatic viewpoint. We begin
with the classic power indices and then, we discuss the generalizations of the properties they
satisfy to situations with externalities.
There are two properties that are shared by all the classic indices that we consider here,
symmetry and the null player property. Symmetry is an equal treatment of equals property,
which states that two players who can be exchanged with no impact in any situation should
have the same power.10 The null player property states that if an agent’s participation in a
coalition never makes a difference, then it should be allocated no power (Dubey and Shapley,
1979). A property that distinguishes the Banzhaf index from the rest is efficiency. In general,
it does not share one unit of power among the players. Nonetheless, the Banzhaf index
satisfies interesting collusion properties (Haller, 1994), i.e., it is independent to the collusion
of two players into one. Finally, the power indices based on minimal winning coalitions,
presented in Section 2.3, are different from the rest as they are not additive (or linear). More
precisely, they do not satisfy the transfer property (see Dubey, 1975), which is a variant of
additivity used in many axiomatizations of power indices. To pin down each of these indices
Deegan and Packel (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983) consider some weighted variants of
the transfer property.11
Some of the classic properties can be extended quite naturally to the framework of simple
games with externalities. For instance, efficiency, symmetry, and the transfer property (see
Álvarez-Mozos et al., 2017) but also the properties used to axiomatize the Deegan-Packel
and Public good indices have rather obvious generalizations (Alonso-Meijide et al., 2017a).
Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada (2015) also use natural generalizations of the properties used by
Casajus (2012) to characterize the Λ-Banzhaf value. The null player property however, has
at least two possible extensions to games with externalities (see, for instance de Clippel and
Serrano, 2008). They differ in the situations that are considered to determine null players.
The Externality-free index satisfies both extensions whereas the Average index satisfies only
the weakest one (Macho-Stadler et al., 2007).
10In most axiomatic characterizations symmetry can be replaced by anonymity (a stronger property) that
requires the power to be independent to the labeling of the players (see, for instance Shapley, 1953).
11Or alternatively, weighted versions of the monotonicity property (Young, 1985).
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3 Results
In this section we apply the indices presented in Section 2 to a real legislature in which
externalities play a role: The Basque Parliament or Legelbitzarra. To begin with, we depict
in Table 1 the seat distribution in Legebiltzarra since 1984.12
Term of office Parties and seats
1984
EAJ-PNV PSE HB AP EE
32 19 11 7 6
1986
PSE EAJ-PNV HB EA EE AP CDS
19 17 13 13 9 2 2
1990
EAJ-PNV PSE HB EA PP EE UA
22 16 13 9 6 6 3
1994
EAJ-PNV PSE-EE HB PP EA IU-EB UA
22 12 11 11 8 6 5
1998
EAJ-PNV PP PSE-EE EH EA IU-EB UA
21 16 14 14 6 2 2
2001
EAJ-PNV PP PSE-EE EA EH IU-EB
25 19 13 8 7 3
2005
EAJ-PNV PSE-EE PP PCTV EA IU-EB Aralar
21 18 15 9 8 3 1
2009
EAJ-PNV PSE-EE PP Aralar EBB EA UPyD
30 25 13 4 1 1 1
2012
EAJ-PNV EH-Bildu PSE-EE PP UPyD
27 21 16 10 1
2016
EAJ-PNV EH-Bildu Podemos PSE-EE PP
28 18 11 9 9
Table 1: Composition of the Basque Parliament 1984-2016
To better understand Table 1 it is important to point out that the Basque political
system is determined by two cleavages, the left-right and the centre-periphery. We can
find potentially influential parties in the 4 corners of the board: left-periphery (HB, EE,
EH, PCTV, Aralar, EH-Bildu), right-periphery (EAJ-PNV, EA), left-centre (PSE, IU-EB,
12We have omitted the results of the 1980 election (the first after the Spanish transition to democracy)
because the use of the plurality rule in the investiture procedure began in the 1984 election.
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Podemos) and right-centre (AP/PP, CDS, UA). The acronyms in the table stand for: Eu-
sko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV), Partido Socialista de Euskadi
(PSE), Herri Batasuna (HB), Alianza Popular (AP), Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), Eusko Alka-
rtasuna (EA), Centro Democrático Social (CDS), Partido Popular (PP), Unidad Alavesa
(UA), Izquierda Unida-Ezker Batua (IU-EB), Euskal Herritarrok (EH), Ezker Batua-Berdeak
(EBB), Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD) and Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu). For fur-
ther information about the history and ideology of the parties in this table see Ansolabehere
and Puy (2015).
We have computed the five power indices presented before in the simple games with
externalities associated with the 10 legislatures that are shown in the table. We examine
the results in two ways. First, we analyze the power distribution in some representative
legislatures. Second, we study the evolution of the results for the political forces that, in our
opinion, are representative of each corner of the Basque political board.
Before we perform the analysis, it is necessary to introduce some notions about the
interpretation of the indices and the computation of the Λ-Banzhaf index.
On the interpretation of the indices and the selection of Λ
We consider 5 different power indices, 4 of which meet the efficiency property: The Externality-
free index, the Average index, the DP-Index and the PG-Index. Moreover, all of the 5 indices
return values bounded between 0 and 1. Thereby, there are 4 indices which are efficient and
[0, 1] bounded. The interpretation of these indices will be easy as they can be understood as
the proportion of power that each party holds in the chamber.
For the other index, the Λ-Banzhaf index, the frame becomes a little bit more diffuse,
since the results cannot be interpreted as shares of power. To solve this problem, we have
decided to normalize the Λ-Banzhaf index in this work. The resulting power index is denoted
by Λ-Banzhaf N.13
Moreover, as shown in Section 2.2, for the computation of this last index it is necessary to
define a family of probability distributions Λ = {λN : N ⊆ Ω} ∈ L that is consistent. Álvarez-
Mozos and Tejada (2015) propose a variety of such families. Based on one of them we
13It is worth to point out that the normalized version of the Banzhaf index losses some important properties
of the original index like the transfer property described in Section 2.4.
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suggest a method to introduce the ideology of the parties that make up the chamber into the
probability distributions that lead to the computation of the index.
The family of probability distributions proposed by the authors, denoted by Λp, is defined
for each partition of the player set, P ∈ P(N), and each embedded coalition (S, P ) ∈ ECN
by
λN(S, P ) =

p if (S, P ) = (S, {S,N \ S})
1− p if (S, P ) = (S, {S, {i}i∈N\S})
0 otherwise
(2)
Thereby, the only problem that remains is the selection of the parameter p ∈ (0, 1). It
is in this step that we introduce the ideology of the agents as a main factor to estimate the
probabilities of the formation of each embedded coalition. The idea is to define p as the
probability that the grand coalition forms in N . To estimate such probability we take into
account how much likely are the players to collaborate given their ideological differences and
similarities. For the evaluation of these differences the cleavages that vertebrate the political
arena in the party system under study are of paramount importance.
As we said in the Introduction, it is well known that the Basque political system is
structured by two essential cleavages: The left-right dimension and the center-periphery
dimension. Accordingly, the probability estimation method is based on these two cleavages.
The method is easily adaptable to any desired number of dimensions, though. Let E(i) ∈
[1, 10] be the position of each player i ∈ N in the left-right axis, where 1 represents the position
further to the left and 10 the one further to the right. In a similar way, let N (i) ∈ [1, 10] be
the position of each player i ∈ N in the center-periphery axis, where 1 represents the position
further to the center and 10 the one further to the periphery. Also, let D(i, j) be the sum of
the absolute differences between the players i, j in the considered cleavages.
The probability that the grand coalition {N} forms can be defined as follows:14







Where c is the number of cleavages selected, 2 in this case.
14Please note that in this case we employ the notation P to refer to the probability that an event occurs,
not to a partition of the player set N .
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As a result of this operation we get that the coalition formation is a certain event if there
are no ideological differences between the players and that it is an impossible event when
those differences are maximum15.
We have used this method to obtain the probability distributions Λ in this work, but
any arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] may be used instead without loss of validity. In order to apply the
method, we needed to locate each party in an ideological spectrum. This operation was done
according with the results of the CIS Postelectoral Barometres16 for each election, which
reflect the way in which citizens locate each party within the two cleavages. The results for
the centre-periphery axis were only available starting from the fifth term. For the left-right
cleavage results were missing for the fourth and sixth legislatures, and we estimated them
using the empirical mean of the results for the previous and next legislatures.
Next, we illustrate this procedure for the most recent legislature under study.
Example 3.1 Since the elections in 2016, five parties (EAJ-PNV, EH-Bildu, Podemos,
PSE-EE and PP) are represented in the camera. Figure 1 depicts the ideological positions of
the parties according to the corresponding postelectoral barometer.
In Table 2 we describe the distances, D(i, j), between each pair of parties, i, j. Recall that
we use the taxicab distance, obtained by adding the distances in each of the two cleavages
considered.
D(i, j) PNV EH-Bildu Podemos PSE-EE PP
PNV 0 5.03 7.12 6.33 8.85
EH-Bildu 5.03 0 4.97 8.48 13.88
Podemos 7.12 4.97 0 3.51 8.91
PSE-EE 6.33 8.48 3.51 0 5.40
PP 8.85 13.88 8.91 5.40 0
Table 2: Absolute ideological diferences between parties (2016)
Using Equation (3), we obtain the probability that the grand coalition forms in this legis-
lature, p = P ({N}) = 0.5973333. This is the p value that we use in Equation (2) to build
15Given that we are working with differences between pairs, the sum of differences can only be maximum
if N = 2.
16Links to the studies: Study 1402 (1984), Study 1565 (1986), Study 1903 (1990), Study 2308 (1998), Study
2421 (2001), Study 2601 (2005), Study 2795 (2009), Study 2964 (2012), Study 3154 (2016). The studies can
only be found in spanish.
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Figure 1: Ideological position of the parties (2016)
the probability distribution for the Λ-Banzhaf index.
3.1 Power in the Legebiltzarra
In this first part of the analysis we focus on 5 out of the 10 analyzed terms of office in order to
discover some trends and particularities of the indices.17 The interested reader is addressed
to Arévalo-Iglesias (2018) where the results of the 10 terms are detailed.
3.1.1 1984 Legebiltzarra
In this election only PNV proposed a candidate: Carlos Garaikoetxea, who had already been
elected as Lehendakari in the 1980 election, and was reelected due to the favorable vote of
PNV(32) and the abstention of PSE(19), AP(7) and EE(6). Herri Batasuna’s deputies left
the chamber before the voting. The values for the indexes are shown in Table 2.
17The numerical results have been obtained using the software R. The routines developed are available
upon request to the authors.
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Index\Party PNV PSE HB AP EE
EFI 0.7000 0.1167 0.1167 0.0333 0.0333
Average 0.6500 0.1083 0.1083 0.0667 0.0667
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.6296 0.1112 0.1112 0.0740 0.0740
DPI 0.6111 0.0741 0.1296 0.0926 0.0926
PGI 0.4375 0.1250 0.1875 0.1250 0.1250
Share of seats 0.4267 0.2533 0.1467 0.0933 0.0800
Table 3: Power indices in the 1984 Basque Parliament
This first term brings a 5-player game. This leads to a relatively small set of partitions
P(N) which eases the computational burden. AP and EE are symmetric players in the game
with externalities.18 It is interesting to note that the notion of symmetry depends on weather
externalities are considered or not. It can happen that players are symmetric in the classic
game and not in the game with externalities. PSE and HB have the same power according to
the indices based on marginal contributions, but not for the ones based on minimal winning
embedded coalitions. In fact, PSE gets the same power for the PGI that AP and EE, even
when their shares of seats are much smaller. This happens because the sizes of their sets of
minimal winning embedded coalitions coincide (are equal to 2).
In political terms we can see that the power is very concentrated in hands of PNV, the
largest party. The power indices reflect this fact, as all of them give to PNV a share of
power greater than its proportion of seats, and this share is more than a half for all the
indices except the PGI. The EFI is the index that gives this party the highest share of power,
and the PGI the one that distributes it more. These behaviors set a pattern that continues
throughout the rest of legislatures.
3.1.2 1986 Legebiltzarra
In 1986 elections two different candidates run for Lehendakari: Jose Antonio Ardanza, from
PNV, and Juan Carlos Yoldi, from Herri Batasuna, who was imprisoned in the moment of
the voting. Ardanza was appointed Lehendakari with absolute majority in the first ballot
with the favorable votes of PNV(17), PSE(19) and CDS(2). It is curious that the party with
more seats, PSE, decided to support PNV’s candidate instead of proposing its own.
18Two players are said to be symmetric in a game if swapping them does not change the worth of any
(embedded) coalition.
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Index\Party PSE-EE PNV HB EA EE AP CDS
EFI 0.3929 0.1595 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.0095 0.0095
Average 0.2737 0.2327 0.1664 0.1664 0.1142 0.0233 0.0233
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.2588 0.2462 0.1541 0.1541 0.1541 0.0164 0.0164
DPI 0.2664 0.1680 0.1600 0.1600 0.1530 0.0464 0.0464
PGI 0.2234 0.1685 0.1612 0.1612 0.1538 0.0659 0.0659
Share of seats 0.2533 0.2267 0.1733 0.1733 0.1200 0.0267 0.0267
Table 4: Power indices in the 1986 Basque Parliament
We face now a 7-player game. As a consequence of the rise in the number of players, the
power is much less concentrated. Again, the EFI is the index that gives the biggest share of
power to the largest party (PSE), but this share is much smaller than it was in the previous
election. Also, the PGI is once again the most distributive index, followed closely by the
DPI. The Average index and the Banzhaf index are the ones that give the greatest amount
of power to the second force, as happened in the first term.
The third, fourth and fifth terms of office bring similar patterns, with PNV dominating
the game again and PSE (now united with EE), PP and the abertzale left parties (first HB
and later EH) competing for the second place. Note that these parties represent the four
corners of the board in relation with the left-right and center-periphery cleavages. Since we
do not identify any new patterns in these terms, we skip to the sixth.
3.1.3 2001 Legebiltzarra
PNV’s candidate, Juna José Ibarretxe, who was already elected in 1998, was reelected by
simple majority with the support of PNV(33) and IU-EB(3). He was the only candidate.
Table 5 shows the results for this term. The main change with respect to the previous
terms is that UA did not get representation in the chamber, leading to a 6-player game. This
increases the concentration of power in hands of PNV, who gets half the power according to
the EFI.
At the opposite end, IU-EB, who wins a seat regarding the previous term, has no power
according to the EFI and Λ-Banzhaf indices, and has very little also according to the Average
index.
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Index\Party PNV PP PSE-EE EA EH IU-EB
EFI 0.5000 0.2500 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 0
Average 0.4139 0.2264 0.1736 0.0847 0.0806 0.0208
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.3892 0.2513 0.1920 0.0838 0.0838 0
DPI 0.4722 0.1389 0.1056 0.1111 0.1056 0.0667
PGI 0.3390 0.1695 0.1356 0.1356 0.1356 0.0847
Share of seats 0.3333 0.2533 0.1733 0.1067 0.0933 0.0400
Table 5: Power indices in the 2001 Basque Parliament
We skip to the eighth term in order to show some considerations about the Average index.
3.1.4 2009 Legebiltzarra
The term after the 2009 elections was the very only in the whole history of the Basque
Parliament where a candidate not from PNV won the investiture. Patxi López, candidate
of PSE-EE, defeated PNV’s candidate Juan José Ibarretxe, who had been elected in the
previous three terms, with the support of PSE-EE(25), PP(13) and UPyD(1), whose sum
was enough to achieve the absolute majority.
Index\Parties PNV PSE-EE PP Aralar EBB EA UPyD
EFI 0.6143 0.1976 0.1143 0.0310 0.0143 0.0143 0.0143
Average 0.4560 0.2665 0.2332 0.0165 0.0093 0.0093 0.0093
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.3838 0.3049 0.2786 0.0132 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065
DPI 0.6250 0.0625 0.0500 0.0375 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750
PGI 0.4324 0.1081 0.0541 0.0811 0.1081 0.1081 0.1081
Share of seats 0.4000 0.3333 0.1733 0.0533 0.0133 0.0133 0.0133
Table 6: Power indices in the 2009 Basque Parliament
It is surprising that PNV lost the voting given the huge proportion of power that the
indices allocate to it. In fact, only the Average and the Λ-Banzhaf indices assign a power
quota greater than 0.5 to the members of the winning coalition {PSE-EE, PP, UPyD}. The
other four indices, instead, allocate more power to the members of the losing coalition {PNV,
Aralar, EBB}. The reason why there is such a concentration of power in the hands of PNV
even though this is a 7-player game is that three of the players (EBB, EA and UPyD) have
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only one deputy in the chamber. Of course, these three players receive an identical share of
power no matter what index we consider. It is interesting how these three players get equal
or even better shares of power than PSE-EE and PP acording with DPI and PGI, given that,
despite their small size, participate in at least as many minimal winning embedded coalitions
than the middle sized parties.
3.1.5 2012 Legebiltzarra
In 2012 elections PNV comes back to the government with Iñigo Urkullu, who is chosen by
simple majority in the second round with the only support of its party (27). The abertzale
left coalition EH-Bildu (21) proposed Laura Mintegi as an alternative candidate, but was
only supported by her party. The rest of forces in the chamber, i.e., PSE-EE, PP and UPyD,
abstained. The results are depicted in Table 7.
Index\Party PNV EH-Bildu PSE-EE PP UPyD
EFI 0.5833 0.2500 0.0833 0.0833 0
Average 0.4333 0.2597 0.1764 0.0931 0.0375
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.4250 0.2550 0.1850 0.0850 0.0500
DPI 0.3939 0.2576 0.1667 0.1212 0.0606
PGI 0.2857 0.2857 0.1905 0.1429 0.0952
Share of seats 0.3600 0.2800 0.2133 0.1333 0.0133
Table 7: Power indices in the 2012 Basque Parliament
A main feature of the ninth term is the reduction of the parties represented in the chamber.
We find now a 5-player game with a very small player, UPyD, that is powerless according to
EFI. This index is also the only one that assigns equal power to PSEE-EE and PP.
3.1.6 2016 Legebiltzarra
In the current term of office Iñigo Urkullu, candidate of PNV, was reelected (he had already
been Lehendakari in the previous term) with the support of PNV(28) and PSE-EE(9). The
other candidate was Maddalen Iriarte, from EH-Bildu, who only obtained the 18 votes from
her party.
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Index\Party PNV EH-Bildu Podemos PSE-EE PP
EFI 0.5667 0.1500 0.1500 0.0667 0.0667
Average 0.4722 0.1806 0.1806 0.0833 0.0833
Λ-Banzhaf N 0.4100 0.2130 0.2130 0.0820 0.0820
DPI 0.4167 0.1667 0.1667 0.1250 0.1250
PGI 0.2800 0.2000 0.2000 0.1600 0.1600
Share of seats 0.3733 0.2400 0.1467 0.1200 0.1200
Table 8: Power indices in the 2016 Basque Parliament
In this term two of the traditional forces of the chamber, PSE-EE and PP, see how their
number of seats sinks. EH-Bildu, that emerged in the previous term, consolidates as the
second force. We have again a 5-player game, and for its simplicity EH-Bildu and Podemos
are symmetric players in the game, even though they have a quite different number of seats.
Of course, PSE-EE and PP, which have the same share of seats, are symmetric too.
3.2 Evolution of the power by ideologies
We now analyze the evolution of the power for each of the four corners of the political board.
For each of these corners we have chosen one party that we think is the most represen-
tative: PNV for right-periphery, AP/PP for right-centre, PSE/PSE-EE for left-centre and
HB/EH/Aralar/EH-Bildu for left-periphery.19
It is important to have in mind that all the considered indices assume that all coalitions are
feasible. However, it is clear that in reality some coalitions are unlikely (or even impossible)
for ideological reasons.
3.2.1 Right-Periphery
PNV has been the hegemonic force in the Basque Parliament since its birth. It has been the
main party of the chamber in 10 out of 11 terms of office and their candidates have won the
investiture in another 10.
19In the case of this last one, because of the ban of HB first and EH later, it has been impossible to take
one single party. We have chosen these four because of their common origins and shared membership (Calvo,
2012).
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Figure 2: Evolution of the power of PNV
Figure 2 shows this hegemony: PNV gets a proportion of seats greater than 0.3 in every
election, except for the year 1986. The power indices give this party a weight even greater
than its seats proportion, with the exception of the PGI. As we have seen, this index is the
most proportional one as it distributes the power more evenly.
The majoritarian feature of the EFI is glaring. Note that in the 1986 election, the only
one in which PNV is not the first force of the chamber, this index falls dramatically. In the
other hand, in the rest of the legislatures it is, by far, the highest index.
The Λ-Banzhaf, Average and Deegan-Packel indices occupy an intermediate place between
the PGI and the EFI, and the three of them over represent the power of PNV.
In our opinion, this overestimation of PNV’s power in relation with its proportion of seats
shows how the investiture procedure employed in the Basque Parliament benefits the first
force, as it gives it much more power than its share of seats. The dominance of almost all of
the investitures exerted by PNV seems to confirm this idea.
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3.2.2 Left-Center
PSE has traditionally been the second force of the Basque Parliament, with some excep-
tions,20 and it is the only party different from PNV that has managed to reach the presidency
of the Basque Government.
Figure 3: Evolution of the power of PSE
The Average index is the highest one overall. In the second term it is largely surpassed by
the EFI, given that PSE becomes the biggest force in the chamber in 1986. In the last term
PSE sinks to become, along with PP, the last force, and in consequence the PGI becomes
the highest one and over represents the power of PSE due to its proportional nature.
3.2.3 Left-Periphery
The political history of the Basque Country cannot be understood without the role of the
abertzale left, even before the democracy. The term refers to the nationalist stream born
20In the second, fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth legislatures.
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in the 50’s as a leftist alternative to PNV, whose organizations share as common goals the
independence and the socialism, even though they do not share the methods (Calvo, 2012).
However, the ban of the main abertzale left parties, namely Herri Batasuna, Euskal Her-
ritarrok and PCTV, prevented them from playing a decisive role in the Basque Parliament.
This fact is specially evident in the 2009 election, when the traditional abertzale trend linked
with Batasuna asked their supporters to vote null instead of voting Aralar, who was ideologi-
cally close but condemned the armed conflict of ETA. However, from 2012 on, the emergence
of EH-Bildu has made the abertzale left the second most influential force in the chamber,
position that they keep holding nowadays.
Figure 4: Evolution of the power of the abertzale left
Taking a look at Figure 4, the EFI is always between the lowest indices, given that the
abertzale left has never managed to become the first force. The PGI is the one with the
highest overall level, specially in the legislatures where the abertzale left got its worst results:
2001, 2005 and 2009.
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3.2.4 Right-Center
Although PP has been, alongside with PSOE, the dominant party of the Spanish political
system since the transition to democracy, it has never been able to exercise such dominion
in the Basque region. That does not mean that it has been irrelevant, as it has managed to
compete effectively for the second place with PSE and the abertzale left, and it was part of
a government coalition with PSE-EE in the year 2009.
Figure 5: Evolution of the power of PP
As we can see in Figure 5, the PGI over represents the power of PP in the legislatures
where it gets bad results (1984, 1986, 2012 and 2016). The DPI values are very close to
these.
Instead, the Average index and the EFI show low shares of power in these legislatures,
but a remarkable growth in those where PP is the second or third force of the chamber
(1994-2009). This is particularly true for the Average index. The growth of the Λ-Banzhaf
index in the sixth term (2001) is remarkable. At that term PP got its best results, becoming
the second force with 19 seats, 6 more than the PSE-EE.
Looking back we can see that the PGI is the only one that over represents the small
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forces, while the other four tend to over represent the first force, which is specially dramatic
in the case of the EFI.
4 Conclusions
To start with, we have seen that incorporating externalities to classic simple games allows
us to study the distribution of power more accurately in some situations. We have applied
five recently proposed power indices for games with externalities to a real example to explore
their usefulness. Below, we describe the main observed trends of the these indices, which can
be divided in two families.
On the one hand, we focus on the three indices that generalize the most popular power
indices, namely the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The Externality-free index seems
to be the one that rewards the most the largest party of the chamber. The Average index
is the one that gives more power to the second largest party in most cases. The behavior of
the normalized Λ-Banzhaf index is quite similar to the Average index and it seems that the
probability distribution that we have estimated from the ideological positions has not added
much value to the analysis.
On the other hand, the two indices that only use minimal winning coalitions show quite
different power distributions from the other three. In general, they distribute the power much
more evenly. This behavior is in line with the classic indices that they extend. The DP-Index
is less proportional than the PGI-Index and many times is closer to the indices of the other
family.
The main conclusion that we can draw from our analysis is that the Basque investiture
procedure, based on a plurality rule, favors the dominance of the biggest party. This feature
has allowed PNV to remain the dominant force of the system. In general terms, the real
power of the largest party is higher than its share of seats, we consider this an evidence of
a deeply majoritarian investiture procedure. In addition, in most cases the power of small
parties is lower than their proportion of seats.
So far, the voting procedure has eased the governability in a deeply fragmented political
system, where a great number of political forces have managed to get representation. How-
ever, we can observe that the number of competing parties tends to reduce in the last two
25
legislatures. The reduction of the fragmentation may open the debate whether this system
continues to be necessary.
In the future, we would like to incorporate restrictions to the cooperation among parties
in order to evaluate their impact. For instance, in some cases parties have clearly stated that
they will not collaborate with other parties. This opens the door to restrict the coalitions
that we use to compute the power indices. Similarly, we would like to use the identified
positions of the parties in the two dimensional ideological space to compute some spatial
power indices. Our purpose is to compare the power distributions in each of these models
and determine what model describes the reality more faithfully, if any.
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6:153–181.
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